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Optimal Transboundary Water Diversion: The Case of the Senegal River
Introduction
Water resources shared between two or more countries form a significant portion
of the world’s fresh water.  Although the efficient handling of shared water resources is
vitally important, there are still numerous impediments to the optimal use of these
resources: conflicts of interests between co-basin States, opposing priorities on river
basin issues, and externalities (Elhance, 1999; Falkenmark, 1986; Godana, 1985; Wilson,
1995; Just and Netanyahu, 1998). An economic analysis of water diversion integrating
basin-wide benefits and costs may shed light on possible “win-win” negotiations
resulting in positive non-zero sum games.  
The Senegal River provides an interesting case study of transboundary water
diversion. Shared by three countries (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania), unilateral
management decisions by Senegal have forestalled cooperative agreements with
neighboring riparian countries.
1 
The thrust of this article is to determine the costs and benefits of diverting water
from the Senegal River.  More specifically, it pursues three objectives.  First, it estimates
the costs and benefits accruing to different parties affected by such a water diversion.
Second, it develops and implements an empirical model for determining the socially
optimal level of water diversion. This solution is compared to the status quo and to a
competitive market allocation of water diversion. Third, it ascertains the policy
implications and alternative policy schemes that can be used to implement a water
diversion program.2
A Conceptual Model of Water Diversion
When two or more countries use common resources, there is potential for the
existence of unidirectional or reciprocal externalities.  In those circumstances, resources
are inefficiently used.  However, so long as costs are fully integrated and compensation is
possible, full cooperation will yield efficient water diversion from the basin.
Following Becker and Easter (1999), the benefit of diverting water is given by a













where users are i = 1, ...n (a user i refers here to a country);  i w  is the amount of water
diverted by user i;  ) ( i i w B  is the money benefit to user i from diverting wi; and α1, α2 > 0.








The cost for user i is given by a positive, increasing, continuous, convex quadratic
function.  This user cost consists of the direct cost of diverting water,  ) ( i i w DC , as well
as the indirect cost,  ) (W ECi , associated with decreasing the river stock.  We assume that
the effects of user i’s actions on its own cost function are the same as on any other user.













Where  1 β  and  2 β  are positive parameters (> 0).  The external cost depends on the total
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where γ1, and γ2 are positive parameters.
Assume that there exists a social planner who would decide on a basin wide
policy that guarantees an optimal solution.  To determine the economic optimal level of
water diversion, water should be diverted up to the point where marginal benefits from
diverting one unit of water is equal to the sum of marginal damages to all users in the
river basin. This is equivalent to maximizing the following equation:
(6)  . ) ( ) ( ) (
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Under competition, each country ignores any external costs. Thus, the solution










As one would expect, 
* * s c w w ≥ , indicating that competition results in excess
diversion of water. 4
Estimating the Benefits of Water Diversion
Agricultural benefits constitute by far the most significant benefits from diverting
water inland. The proposed project only involves directing water into Senegal and
although Mauritania could in principle do the same, it would do so at a higher and
practically prohibitive cost.  Indeed, Senegalese agriculture is based on rainfed
production and suffers dramatically from drastic water deficits. The diversion project
allows farmers to pursue in two seasonal production activities rather than only one. 
Consider a typical Senegalese farm producing two crops, peanuts and millet.
Farmers production choices involve three net outputs (Qi), of which the first two are
outputs produced (Qi > 0, i = 1, 2) and the third is a variable input (Qi < 0, i = 3).  In the
absence of irrigation data, rainfall (R) is used as an empirical proxy and is treated as an
exogenous variable.
2  Let the expected nominal output prices and the input price be
defined as Pi (Pi >0, i = 1,..,3) and the expected profit as Π.  Using P3 as the numéraire
price, then the normalized expected prices of outputs are Pi=Pi/P3 (i = 1, 2) and the
normalized variable profit is  π= Π / P3.  Following Diewert (1973) and Lau (1976), the
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where ai, bi and ci are parameters and other notation is as defined above.
It is required that the above profit function be continuous, twice differentiable,
convex, and monotonic for the normalized prices and the other exogenous factor.
Applying Hotelling’s lemma (Lau, 1976), the following system of output supply and
variable input demand functions (Qi
*) is obtained:5











* = + + + = =
∂
∂ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =






j ij i i
i
π














Assuming that profit is on a per hectare basis, (11) is the value of marginal of
water per hectare. It is reasonable to assume that  . 0 / = ∂ ∂ R C
3 Consequently, (11)
represents the demand for water.
Following the theoretical framework above, from equation (10) the following
system of equations (including the domestic demand for millet) is estimated:
(12) 
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where  1 Q  and  2 Q  are respectively the peanut and millet yield. Am represents millet area,
1 p  and  2 p  are the normalized prices of peanut and (expected) millet, and the ui’s are
random errors.   Prices in the supply equations are deflated by the fertilizer price, while
the consumer price index (d) is used as a deflator in the demand equation for millet.  In
addition, symmetry is imposed with  21 12 α α =  in order to reduce the number of
parameters to be estimated. The domestic demand for millet is included to account for
possible price  effects of changes in supply due to additional water access. 
Using (12) along with (11), the change in agricultural profit from a change in
rainfall is given by: 
(13) 
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To evaluate the demand for water, it is necessary to assess the benefits of
additional amounts of rainfall. Consequently, it is important to estimate the desirable
level of rainfall (R
d) from the farmer’s perspective.  Equation (13) can be utilized to
retrieve this desirable level.
Once the desirable level of rainfall is known, one can assess the benefits of
moving from actual rainfall to that desirable rainfall level.  This amounts to the following
integral:
(14)  ∫ +
d R
R





It is quite simple to convert rain into a water irrigation equivalent. First, consider
that 1mm of rain is equivalent to 10 m
3 of water per ha (Bousquet et al., 1997).  Since
irrigation is more efficient than rainfall in water distribution to crops, water can be valued
at 80% of rainfall (Bousquet et. al., 1997).  Thus, the amount of water equivalent to rain
is given by  8 . 0 10 x x R w = .  Equation (14) then becomes:
(15)  ∫ +
d w
w
dw w) ( 1 0 α α
Note that  0 α  and  1 α  correspond to 
*
0 α  and 
*
1 α  when scaled by the rate of
transformation of rainfall into water irrigation equivalence given above. The expression
in (15) is the empirical approximation to equation (1), the benefits of water diversion.
Estimating the Costs of Water Diversion
One of the main components of the costs of water diversion is the investment cost
for the construction of the water transportation facility (pumping stations, diversion7
canals, and other works).  The operating and maintenance costs represent the other major
component of the direct costs of diversion.  The operating costs include the costs of labor,
material and energy required to pump the water.  The value of the land taken for the
construction of canals should also be imputed even if land is publicly owned.
Besides these direct costs borne out by the project builders, it is possible that the
project implementation causes collateral damages.
4 Farmers that perform flood recession
agriculture in sensual Mauritania are the first victims.  These farmers cultivate their plots
around the river at the end of the rainy season once the flood has ceased and the river has
receded.  This activity usually constitutes their main source of agricultural revenue and
the magnitude of this source of income depends essentially on the extent of the flooding
(Salem-Murdock and Niasse, 1996).
The direct cost function, which includes operating and maintenance costs, draws
from the work of Scott et al. (1985).  Direct costs are determined by the rate of water
flow (y) rather than by the total amount of water diverted and are represented by:
(16)  , 1 0 t t t y y DC β β + =
where yt is the amount of water transferred in period t.




y y W = ⇒ = * , where W is the

















Farmers of flood recession agriculture represent the main group that suffers from
external damage. There are about 100,000 ha cultivated under this production system, on8
both sides (Senegal and Mauritania) of the Senegal river.  Revenue per ha were estimated
to amount about 8,500 FCFA per ha (Crousse et al., 1991).  These values were used to
estimate the parameters  0 γ  and  1 γ  of a quadratic external cost function:
(18)  .
2
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It was assumed that external costs start taking effect at 100,000 m
3 of water
diversion.  At about 200 billion m
3 of water, any additional diversion would have no
effect, the maximum damage being already attained.  Equation (18) corresponds to
equation (5) for the external costs.
Implementing Alternative Scenarios
After estimating the cost and benefit functions for water diversion, the social
planner's and the competitive solutions were implemented. The results are presented
considering both the rainy and the dry seasons. 
Using equation (15), (17), and (18) and assuming that Senegal decides to divert
water, the net social benefit (NSB) which is the empirical counterpart of equation (6) is
given by:
(19) 
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d − = ~  is the difference between desired and actual water, A is irrigated area,
and other notation is as defined above. 
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Plugging the value of 
* ~s w  into (19), one obtains the optimal NSB value (
* s Z ).
The actual value of rainfall is crucial in determining the level of additional water needed
and subsequently the benefits of providing this supplementary water.  To take into
account the uncertainty of the water supply, a Monte Carlo procedure using the mean and
standard deviation of rainfall (or its water irrigation equivalent), and assuming normal
distribution, generates 1,000 random numbers (rainfalls).  These numbers can then be
used in the calculation of the optimal water irrigation and the net social benefit.
To implement the competitive scenario, external costs are ignored and equation
(19) reduces to its first two components:
(21)  .
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c Z  with respect to w ~ , one obtains the equilibrium level of water
















Comparing equations (20) and (22), it is clear that 
* ~ ~ s c w w > , as expected.  Again,
using equation (22) and inserting it back into equation (21), one obtains NSB for the
competitive solution. Further details on data sources and management can be found in the
appendix.
Empirical Results
The estimated parameters for the system of supply equations in (12) is presented
in  Table 1.  Nearly all the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The estimate for millet ( 22 α ) in the millet yield equation is negative.  This might signal10
the fact that millet is primarily consumed at the household level and is only marginally
supplied to the market.
The results in Table 1 are used to evaluate the change in agricultural profit for a
marginal change in the quantity of rainfall ( dR d / π ).
6 From equation (15), the value of
the parameter estimates  0 α  and  1 α  are respectively 34.665 and -0.0080875 and it follows
that the desirable level of rainfall (R
d) is equal to 536.57 mm.  This quantity is far higher
than the mean rainfall R , which is approximately 356.94 mm.  These values correspond
to the desired level of irrigated water (
d w ) being equal to 4,286 m
3/ha and the mean
water equal of 2,855 m
3/ha. The parameters used in the maximization of the social
planner and competitive objective functions are summarized in Table 3. 
Equation (19) provides the optimal net social benefit while equation (20) provides
the optimal level of water diversion.  The net social benefit is evaluated over 50 years and
its present value is obtained using a 10% discount rate.  Notice that the values of water
used in the base calculation were generated randomly.  The evaluation over 50 years is
repeated 20 times to add to 1,000 random rainfalls. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Three solutions are included for each year: the rainy season, the dry season, and
the combined season (dual production).  The optimal amount of additional water for the
rainy season is on average 62.515 millions m
3, assuming an irrigated area of 62,069 ha.
Regarding the net social value, the results for the rainy season program are not
satisfactory.  Indeed, the net present value of social benefits (subtracting the investment
costs) is negative at all times and is, on average, equal to –24.66 billion FCFA (Table 3).
When the investment costs are excluded, the net social benefit amounts to 4.34 billion11
FCFA.  This outcome implies that the investment should not be made for the sole purpose
of providing additional water to cover agricultural water deficits.
When the dry season is included, enabling double cropping, then the net present
value is positive and reaches, on average, 15.86 billion FCFA.  On the other hand, if the
dry season were considered in isolation, the investment would provide positive figures
around 11.53 billion FCFA.  In this case, the volume of water would be approximately
224.51 millions m
3.
There is a large difference between the rainy and dry season results.  This
difference stems in part from the fact that the demand for additional water during the
rainy season is limited and cannot justify extensive investment expenses.  In addition, the
assumption that the dry season activities do not cause external damage increases the
likelihood of higher returns for that season.
7
Following a procedure similar to the one outlined above, the competitive solution
was obtained. This solution indicates that the optimal amount of additional water needed
during the rainy season is 78.767 millions m
3, a volume greater than the quantity needed
under the social planner’s scenario.  Although the competitive solution yields a greater
volume of water compared to the social planner’s scenario, its returns are lower due to
higher external costs.
In contrast, because it is assumed that external costs are absent during the dry
season, the present value of net social benefit is slightly higher for the competitive
situation (11.63 billion FCFA) relative to the social planner’s case (11.53 billion FCFA).
On the other hand, when considering the whole year, the social planner’s scenario12
becomes dominant (15.86 billion FCFA compared to 15.77 billion for the competitive
case).
Conclusions
The overall objective of this paper was to determine the costs and benefits of
diverting water from the Senegal River. Cost and benefit functions of water diversion
were estimated taking into account external costs to flood recession farmers. 
For both the social planner and the competitive scenarios, building the water
diversion project for the sole purpose of supplying additional water during the rainy
season would not be socially desirable.  The best alternative is a system of double
cropping for which water is made available during the rainy season as well as the dry
season.  This system requires, however, that water allocation during the rainy season be
restrained to its best use, implying that monitoring costs would be incurred.  Another
possibility would be to make water available only during the dry season, which supposes
that the infrastructure would be idle during the rainy season.
Although both scenarios give positive present values of net benefits, the social
planner’s scenario uses smaller quantities of water while providing higher net benefits to
society.  This outcome is expected because the social planner contemplates all costs
including the external costs in contrast to other scenarios in which players ignore costs to
their counterparts and thus pose a greater burden on society by overdrawing water. 
One of the weaknesses of the project is that the benefits are one-sided while the
costs are spread over the different countries that share the river.  However, given the
profitability of the project, it may be worthwhile to design a compensation scheme that
would alleviate the costs that would eventually be imposed on other parties.13
There is, however, no guarantee that any of the options described above would be
applicable, given the fact that farmers in Mauritania may lose while no one in that
country would gain from the project implementation.  This makes it almost impossible
for the Mauritanian policymakers to approve such an initiative.  Unless a compensation
scheme is devised to allow the Mauritanian side to share part of the gains, the status quo
situation is likely to prevail.14
Footnotes
1Since 1972 Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have initiated a cooperative agreement under
the OMVS (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal) treaty to manage the
river basin for irrigation, energy production and navigation (OMVS, 1972).  Two dams
were built to regulate the river flow and prevent salt intrusion from the sea.  In the early
1990s, Senegal designed a plan to divert water from the Senegal River to revitalize its
fossilized valleys. This program is to cover 3,000 km of hydrological axes (Sakho, 1998;
Bitondo et al, 1997).   Four years after the initial decision and an experimental realization
of 150 km, the program entered its active phase of implementation. At the end of 1997,
Mauritanian officials protested vigorously against the Senegalese project. They argued
that this program would threaten the stability of water resources and would therefore
jeopardize Mauritania’s interests.  The government of Senegal decided to momentarily
freeze the project for additional research.
2 To assess the agricultural benefits of irrigation, one starts with the state of nature and
sees how rainfall impacts agricultural production in the region under study.  This process
allows the determination of the desirable level of rainfall and subsequently the amount of
rain deficit.  This amount of rain deficit can then be converted in to a water irrigation
equivalent.  Finally, the agricultural benefits of having additional water through irrigation
can be evaluated.
3 It is assumed that additional costs for a marginal increase in rainfall are zero.  In fact,
unless there is a severe drought that makes farmers reluctant to use fertilizer, it is unlikely
that cost would be influenced by marginal changes in rainfall.
4 A potentially important cost of the project stems from its impact on the environment,
including decreased wildlife habitat consecutive to lower river levels and accelerated
rates of stream erosion (Okidi, 1987). Although these environmental damages are often
difficult to quantify, they should not be ignored.
5 In the empirical implementation, the parameter estimates  0 β  and  1 β  are scaled to take
into consideration the conversion of the flow rate in m
3/s and the variable costs in FCFA.
Thus, equation (17) corresponds to the conceptual equation (3) for direct costs.
6 This marginal change initially included direct as well as market effects. In the empirical
implementation, the market effects turned out to be insignificant.  There are two possible
explanations.  First, rainfall is not crucial to millet production as compared to peanuts.
Second, the role of millet in household consumption may counteract the supply effects.
Calculations conducted with the direct effects alone ( R ∂ ∂ / π ) gave similar results to
those with the full model. Therefore, to keep the model tractable, equation (11) was
simplified to its first term and the market effects were subsequently dropped.
7 This assumption would not persist if one considers the potential cost to navigation, the
latter would mainly affect Mali especially if the OMVS partners decide to implement
their navigation program.  This avenue is not pursued here.15
DATA APPENDIX
The Senegalese diversion project was originally conceived to include three
geographical zones: the north of the peanut basin, which corresponds to the
administrative region of Louga, the Central region (Fatick-Diourbel) and the South-East.
This study is limited to the northern region, which represents the main component of the
project.
The data necessary for the computation of the agricultural benefits represent the
bulk of the regional data needed to implement this analysis.  Monthly rainfall data time
series were obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO, 200D) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
These data span 1960 to 1994 and are relatively decentralized.  They are organized at the
department level, which facilitates aggregation over space and time.
Time series data on area cultivated and the production figures for peanuts and
millet came from the Department of Agriculture of the Senegalese Ministry of Rural
Development.  Price series for peanuts and millet along with the price of fertilizer for the
period under study (1960-1994) originated from the Senegalese Department of Statistics.
The data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) also came from this same source.
The data on investment costs for the diversion project were extracted from various
preliminary studies of the Senegalese program for the revitalization of the fossilized
valleys (Hydroconsult International, 1995, 1996; MEAVF, 1994).  The cost parameters
used in the calculation of the direct costs were obtained from Scott et al. (1985).  The
preliminary data used to estimate the parameters of the external costs were taken from
Crousse et al. (1991).
Once the data were ready for use, three different software packages were
employed to carry out the different estimation tasks.  The SHAZAM 8.0 software was
used in the estimation of the system of equations (13) to determine the parameter of the
agricultural benefit function.  The optimization process to solve for the optimal level of
water and the net social benefit were conducted with the MATHEMATICA 4.0.2 program.
Finally, the numerical solutions were carried out with MS EXCEL 97.16
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Intercept 10 β -0.79822 -2.1173
Peanut Price  11 β 0.1149E-05 2.2656
Millet Price  12 β 0.13153E-05 4.1290
Rain 13 β 0.35032E-03 2.1007
Rain
2
14 β -0.26053E-07 -1.4892
Millet Yield Equation
Intercept 20 β 0.34571 2.1545
Peanut Price  21 β 0.13153E-05 4.1290
Millet Price  22 β -0.26261E-05 -6.2451
Rain 23 β 0.15382E-03 2.2858
Rain
2
24 β -0.16698E-07 -2.2791
Millet Price equation
Intercept 30 β 0.15640E+06 17.564
Area times Yield 31 β -0.46213E-01 -4.3813
GDP/d 32 β -41.942 -9.3156
Table 2. Parameters Used in the Maximization of the Objective Function
Benefits Direct Costs External Costs   Water (m
3) Area (ha)
0 α  = 34.665 0 β  = -24.643 0 γ  = 2.8813
d w  =  4286.22 A = 62,069
1 α  = -
0.0080875
1 β  = 877,168.4 1 γ  = -2.5E-09 w  = 2,855.529
θ  = 10,368,000 w σ  = 789.40419
Table 3. Present Value of Net Social Benefits from Alternative Scenarios (millions
FCFA)













Mean -24,662 11,527 15,865 -24,865 11,630 15,765
St. Error 207 0 207 208 0 208
Median -24,451 11,527 16,076 -24,660 11,630 15,970
Mode N/A 11,527 N/A N/A 11,630 N/A
St. Deviation 924 0 924 928 0 928
Minimum -26,185 11,527 14,342 -26,397 11,630 14,233
Maximum -23,201 11,527 17,326 -23,405 11,630 17,225
Sum -493,239 11,527 317,298 -497,292 232,602 315,310
# Scenarios ** 20 20 20 20 20 20
*  The combined season results are not the sum of the two seasons because the
investment costs are subtracted only once.
** Each scenario is simulated 20 times for a 50 year series.